Such a great piece, and I agree with you. In line with your observations about anti-pacifism, I believe it reaches its most blasphemous when apologists attempt to justify brutal war by the Israelites as an example of "God's justice". It's not God's justice; it's a human narrative. "For I desire mercy, not sacrifice." The fact that people can read the Old Testament and think that Israel's indulgence in the cycle of violence is God's divine command baffles me.
I like the rigor of your argument. What of the argument that would say we have a positive moral duty, rooted in love of neighbor, to use violence against the violent if that is what our neighbor is in need of from us?
I'll answer in a bit of a roundabout way - trust me, I'm not just enjoying the sound of my own voice.
I would say that the concept of the neighbour is so totalizing that we will never find ourselves in a position where we are found protecting the neighbour from the not-neighbour; if there is one person attacking another, if we take the view that we are attempting to capture a God's eye view from within our captured human's eye view and doing our best to dismiss the biases of our subjectivity that could never be as totalizing as the concept of the neighbour, we are always encountering the neighbour in the company of another neighbour. As God loves all humans equally, Christ seems to call us to do the same. There are obvious physical limitations here for the person - how do we actually do that?
Something to bear in mind about 3 is that it is actually a category error: God deals in absolutes (essentially) and humanity deals in possibility (existentially); the moment we start to negotiate with God, we are drawing the commandments out of their essential divine command metaethical justification and instead attempt to replace that justification with an existential human metaethical justification - we already depart from the teaching when we try to encounter the commandment as a curious object of inquiry as opposed to a specific commandment to a specific individual (every specific Christian individual!) that must compare their own actions with the absoluteness of God's revelation. This is Kierkegaard's "deliberation" methodology, broadly Platonic in how it completely separates the capabilities of God and humanity.
So, in a situation where we are faced with an existential problem, e.g., someone who existentially violent (but not essentially so), we have to compare our actions with the absolute ideal of Christian neighbour-love and proceed "towards" that ideal. In that sense, we have a few options: a) defend the neighbour in danger with violence, but never mistake this as holy in its violent nature, i.e., understand it is sin, b) find a method by which to intercede as a peacemaker, however unlikely that method might be (possibly even apparently impossible at first time of consideration!), or c) accept that the world is not the Kingdom of God and, without abandoning our duty to the neighbour who is under attack, know that our efforts are not sufficient to turn the world to God alone - it will be violent for as long as it is not of the Kingdom.
I offer multiple suggestions here as there is no single Christian ethical theory which we can turn to as an ethical system. I would hope, however, that people would prefer (b) and reject (c) wherever it is possible to do so.
Fantastic question. I’m sure A. will have some thoughts, but just a couple thoughts I have—there is no one who is “the violent,” biblically speaking. We have enemies, who may use violence, but we are called to love even them. Secondly, even as we do respond to these enemies, we don’t have to respond in kind. There are many options for protecting the weak that don’t involve violence.
Such a great piece, and I agree with you. In line with your observations about anti-pacifism, I believe it reaches its most blasphemous when apologists attempt to justify brutal war by the Israelites as an example of "God's justice". It's not God's justice; it's a human narrative. "For I desire mercy, not sacrifice." The fact that people can read the Old Testament and think that Israel's indulgence in the cycle of violence is God's divine command baffles me.
I like the rigor of your argument. What of the argument that would say we have a positive moral duty, rooted in love of neighbor, to use violence against the violent if that is what our neighbor is in need of from us?
I'll answer in a bit of a roundabout way - trust me, I'm not just enjoying the sound of my own voice.
I would say that the concept of the neighbour is so totalizing that we will never find ourselves in a position where we are found protecting the neighbour from the not-neighbour; if there is one person attacking another, if we take the view that we are attempting to capture a God's eye view from within our captured human's eye view and doing our best to dismiss the biases of our subjectivity that could never be as totalizing as the concept of the neighbour, we are always encountering the neighbour in the company of another neighbour. As God loves all humans equally, Christ seems to call us to do the same. There are obvious physical limitations here for the person - how do we actually do that?
Something to bear in mind about 3 is that it is actually a category error: God deals in absolutes (essentially) and humanity deals in possibility (existentially); the moment we start to negotiate with God, we are drawing the commandments out of their essential divine command metaethical justification and instead attempt to replace that justification with an existential human metaethical justification - we already depart from the teaching when we try to encounter the commandment as a curious object of inquiry as opposed to a specific commandment to a specific individual (every specific Christian individual!) that must compare their own actions with the absoluteness of God's revelation. This is Kierkegaard's "deliberation" methodology, broadly Platonic in how it completely separates the capabilities of God and humanity.
So, in a situation where we are faced with an existential problem, e.g., someone who existentially violent (but not essentially so), we have to compare our actions with the absolute ideal of Christian neighbour-love and proceed "towards" that ideal. In that sense, we have a few options: a) defend the neighbour in danger with violence, but never mistake this as holy in its violent nature, i.e., understand it is sin, b) find a method by which to intercede as a peacemaker, however unlikely that method might be (possibly even apparently impossible at first time of consideration!), or c) accept that the world is not the Kingdom of God and, without abandoning our duty to the neighbour who is under attack, know that our efforts are not sufficient to turn the world to God alone - it will be violent for as long as it is not of the Kingdom.
I offer multiple suggestions here as there is no single Christian ethical theory which we can turn to as an ethical system. I would hope, however, that people would prefer (b) and reject (c) wherever it is possible to do so.
Thanks for the thoughtful response.
Fantastic question. I’m sure A. will have some thoughts, but just a couple thoughts I have—there is no one who is “the violent,” biblically speaking. We have enemies, who may use violence, but we are called to love even them. Secondly, even as we do respond to these enemies, we don’t have to respond in kind. There are many options for protecting the weak that don’t involve violence.