Anti-pacifism as blasphemy

Framing the issue for the violent amongst the faithful

Christians in many walks of life have sworn to hold to pacifist ethics for a variety of motivations. Sometimes, this is due to a broadly secular understanding of the effectiveness of nonviolent protest¹, which is to say that faithful action is merely a means towards a political end. In an age of global secular sabre-rattling, this seems like a perfectly contemporary opinion to hold if someone wants to swear off violent action. However, this seems a little brash and even naively utopian in a general sense, but also explicitly not theological in its justification in a more particular manner. For Christians who begin their activity with the life of Christ, their pacifist praxis proceeds primarily from Christ’s teachings in the Sermon on the Mount (particularly Matthew 5:5, 7, 9, 21-26, 38-48) and Christ’s “no!” in the Garden of Gethsemane (particularly Matthew 26:50-56).

The Arrest of Christ (c. 1500), by the Master of the Evora Altarpiece, portrays Jesus healing the ear of a servant during his arrest

Of course, for a variety of Constantinian², pragmatic³, or otherwise non-theological reasons, a great number of Christians have been and continue to be non-pacifist—at least, certainly, in their idle talk about the proper management of how the world ought to be. While there is often a fairly reasonable explanation about these positions, e.g., it is better to wield the sword against the Nazis than to allow them to rip through Europe slaughtering Jews, Roma, gays, the disabled, etc., the problem comes in assuming that what we assert to be reasonable within a particular moment of history is actually, despite first appearances, holy—usually with rather heavy-handed reference to the Old Testament or concerningly blunt interpretations of, e.g., Luke 22:36. Augustine’s “just war theory”, an obvious example of pragmatic human reason undercutting divine command seems like a popular example here⁴. Following Eller, it is not clear that this kind of pragmatism is the way that God is revealed through scripture—“being humanly defined, the alternatives we set up are never black and white; at best, they are only differing shades of gray”⁵, but Christ deals in absolutes and does not compromise. The contention for the person who holds, or, at least, attempts to hold, to the pacifist ideal proposed by Christ is that such intentional detraction from the ideal in the name of the church seems to invoke the charge that Christ was in error to be unpragmatically dealing in normative absolutes—which, presumably even for those with a genuine antipathy for exegetical study, seems like quite the problem for the Christian.

To be clear, the pacifist here might suggest that it is understandable in a human sense to turn to violence or to assist with violence when the cards are on the table; however, this understandability in a human sense must be clearly understood as only understandable in a human sense. To make the bounding leap to suggest that particular uses of violence—especially in those philosophically embarrassing moments of subjectively justifying particular uses of violence for ideological reasons, as Marxist, critical theorists, anarchists, fascists, liberals, conservatives, etc. of all kinds are prone to do—are not just understandable in a human sense, but also justified in a Godly sense seems theologically impossible and an exercise in the idealism of “proof-texting”. In the process of rushing towards the goal of justifying the use of violence when the going gets tough, the muddle-headed anti-pacifist seems to suggest that we can justify any particular predilection that we hold in a Godly sense as long as we rush past all theological reflections with such speed that it seems quite clear that what is justifiable in a Godly sense is of little importance for matters forced upon us whilst dwelling within the world. As an example of a person refusing to do such a thing, we might recall Jacques Ellul running guns across the French-Spanish border in order to aid the liberatory forces in the Spanish Civil War against the fascists—but never under the impression that such actions were in any way holy or even theologically justifiable.⁶ In doing what he felt he must in a human sense, Ellul understood that he had sinned in a Godly sense—that choice was made contra Christ due to the pressures of life in a human sense.

An argument against anti-pacifism

I’m usually reluctant to resort to the propositional form when discussing philosophy as it often gives the impression to others that I wish for them to join in dialogue with me on the matters at hand. However, in this situation, it seems appropriate. As such, a small number of theses:

1. It is the case that Christ celebrated meekness, mercy, and peacemaking (Matthew 5:5, 7, 9) as well as commanded His followers not only not to kill but also not to hold onto anger with their neighbours (Matthew 5:21-26), unconditional love for the neighbour (Luke 10:25-37), and to surrender to those who wish to do us harm (Matthew 5:38-48).

2. Christ here presents the Christian ideal, both indicatively and normatively.

3. The individual who holds that pacifism is not central to the Christian message may say: “Living in accordance with Christ’s indicative and normative teachings is difficult-to-impossible for the average person to do, especially when under considerable or mortal threat.”

4. Ought implies can⁷, which, from 3, implies that the average Christian is not expected to keep to Christ’s pacifist ideal.

But, as you have no doubt noticed, my reader, I started this with the rather strong claim that anti-pacifism is blasphemous. It would be morally unjustified to judge the presumably well-intentioned but possibly muddled ideas of our anti-pacifist brothers-in-alms as blasphemers without following through to make the decisive argument. We continue:

6. It appears to be the case that Christ commands the Christian ideal to His followers, regardless of whether it is possible to carry it out in “real life” or we are faced with a genuine mortal threat.

7. Ought implies can, where impossibility implies omissibility.

8. Any ethical maxim that suggests that the moral agent ought to do what is impossible is “unethical to the ethical”⁸.

9. Christ, if we hold to 3, in commanding the Christian ideal of pacifism is acting unethically because He commands the impossible. By implicature, Christians are justified, at the very least, to ignore this maxim and, possibly, all maxims.

Needless to say, this should throw some theological hammers in some militaristic works—as soon as we take a soft stance in proposition 3, we find ourselves in the realms of Vordenken, the presumption of holiness. This isn’t to say that pacifism prima facie is good, but rather that to say that saying anti-pacifism and militarism are morally correct is to say that God is wrong. For one of those humble fools who still hold to a divine command metaethics, that seems like a problem.

Some obvious responses would include that a) Christ ordered the use of violence in the Old Testament, b) Christ’s particular plan for salvation required these particular actions without normative implication, or c) that in “coming to bring the sword”, we are justified to do so as a prophetic action. I would suggest that each of these responses would mean a) we read particularity normatively, an error in exegesis, b) Christ’s life and God’s actions are merely accidental as opposed to necessary, and c) that, while this may be true, it supposes a rather dull exegesis of the passage and also assumes that we can know and elect ourselves as the agents of historical change in a way which is not readily found in either the Old or New Testament. “Who chose you to become a prophet?”, if you like. That dangerous temptation either to want to be a Feuerbach and self-willfully do away with all religion or self-willfully to want to be the apostle.⁹

“It is said that in learning to obey one learns to rule, but what is even more certain is that by being obedient oneself one can teach obedience.”¹⁰

1. A notion that underpins Gene Sharp’s mammoth The Politics of Nonviolent Action, particularly vol. I

2. Discipleship as Political Responsibility, p. 35, J. Yoder

3. “Armed Neutrality, or My Position as a Christian Author in Christendom” in The Point of View, p. 139, S. Kierkegaard

4. Contra Faustum Manichaeum, ch. 26, §69-76, Augustine of Hippo

5. Christian Anarchy: Jesus' Primacy over the Powers, V. Eller

6. “Ellul’s Life and Thought” from Understanding Jacques Ellul, p. 7, J. P. Greenman, R. M. Schuchardt, and N. J. Toly

7. Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 6:50, p. 94, I. Kant

8. A favoured phrase of S. K.’s, notably found in his critique of Schopenhauer. See “Kierkegaard's Uncanny Encounter with Schopenhauer, 1854”, P. Stokes, from Kierkegaard and Great Philosophers, p. 71, ed. R. Králik

9. The Religious Confusion of the Present Age Illustrated by Magister Adler as a Phenomenon: A Mimical Monograph, p. 5, [P. Minor], ed. S. Kierkegaard

10. The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air, p. 36, S. Kierkegaard